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fix: trim 3 SKILL.md files to comply with Anthropic 500-line limit

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Per Anthropic docs: "Keep SKILL.md under 500 lines. Move detailed
reference material to separate files."

- browser-automation: 564 → 266 lines (moved examples to references/)
- spec-driven-workflow: 586 → 333 lines (moved full spec example to references/)
- security-pen-testing: 850 → 306 lines (condensed OWASP/attack details, moved to references/)

No content deleted — all moved to existing reference files with pointers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Reza Rezvani
2026-03-25 15:20:47 +01:00
parent 268061b0fd
commit f352e8cdd0
5 changed files with 298 additions and 1205 deletions
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656
engineering-team/security-pen-testing/SKILL.md
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@@ -60,353 +60,71 @@ python scripts/vulnerability_scanner.py --target web --scope full
python scripts/vulnerability_scanner.py --target api --scope quick --json
```
### A01:2021 — Broken Access Control
### Quick Reference
**Test Procedures:**
1. Attempt horizontal privilege escalation: access another user's resources by changing IDs
2. Test vertical escalation: access admin endpoints with regular user tokens
3. Verify CORS configuration — check `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` for wildcards
4. Test forced browsing to admin pages (`/admin`, `/api/admin`, `/debug`)
5. Modify JWT claims (`role`, `is_admin`) and replay tokens
**What to Look For:**
- Missing authorization checks on API endpoints
- Predictable resource IDs (sequential integers vs. UUIDs)
- Client-side only access controls (hidden UI elements without server checks)
- CORS misconfigurations allowing arbitrary origins
### A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
**Test Procedures:**
1. Check TLS version — reject anything below TLS 1.2
2. Verify password hashing: bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 with adequate cost factor
3. Look for sensitive data in URLs (tokens in query params get logged)
4. Check for hardcoded encryption keys in source code
5. Test for weak random number generation (Math.random() for tokens)
**What to Look For:**
- MD5/SHA1 used for password hashing
- Secrets in environment variables without encryption at rest
- Missing `Strict-Transport-Security` header
- Self-signed certificates in production
### A03:2021 — Injection
**Test Procedures:**
1. SQL injection: test all input fields with `' OR 1=1--` and time-based payloads
2. NoSQL injection: test with `{"$gt": ""}` and `{"$ne": null}` in JSON bodies
3. Command injection: test inputs with `; whoami` and backtick substitution
4. LDAP injection: test with `*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*`
5. Template injection: test with `{{7*7}}` and `${7*7}`
**What to Look For:**
- String concatenation in SQL queries
- User input passed to `eval()`, `exec()`, `os.system()`
- Unparameterized ORM queries
- Template engines rendering user input without sandboxing
### A04:2021 — Insecure Design
**Test Procedures:**
1. Review business logic flows for abuse scenarios (e.g., negative quantities in carts)
2. Check rate limiting on sensitive operations (login, password reset, OTP)
3. Test multi-step flows for state manipulation (skip payment step)
4. Verify security questions aren't guessable
**What to Look For:**
- Missing rate limits on authentication endpoints
- Business logic that trusts client-side calculations
- Lack of account lockout after failed attempts
- Missing CAPTCHA on public-facing forms
### A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
**Test Procedures:**
1. Check for default credentials on admin panels
2. Verify unnecessary HTTP methods are disabled (TRACE, DELETE on public endpoints)
3. Check error handling — stack traces should never leak to users
4. Review HTTP security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
5. Check directory listing is disabled
**What to Look For:**
- Debug mode enabled in production
- Default admin:admin credentials
- Verbose error messages with stack traces
- Missing security headers
### A06:2021 — Vulnerable and Outdated Components
**Test Procedures:**
1. Run dependency audit against known CVE databases
2. Check for end-of-life frameworks and libraries
3. Verify transitive dependency versions
4. Check for known vulnerable versions (e.g., Log4j 2.0-2.14.1)
| # | Category | Key Tests |
|---|----------|-----------|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | IDOR, vertical escalation, CORS, JWT claim manipulation, forced browsing |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | TLS version, password hashing, hardcoded keys, weak PRNG |
| A03 | Injection | SQLi, NoSQLi, command injection, template injection, XSS |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Rate limiting, business logic abuse, multi-step flow bypass |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Default credentials, debug mode, security headers, directory listing |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | Dependency audit (npm/pip/go), EOL checks, known CVEs |
| A07 | Auth Failures | Brute force, session cookie flags, session invalidation, MFA bypass |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Unsafe deserialization, SRI checks, CI/CD pipeline integrity |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Auth event logging, sensitive data in logs, alerting thresholds |
| A10 | SSRF | Internal IP access, cloud metadata endpoints, DNS rebinding |
```bash
# Audit a package manifest
# Audit dependencies
python scripts/dependency_auditor.py --file package.json --severity high
python scripts/dependency_auditor.py --file requirements.txt --json
```
### A07:2021 — Identification and Authentication Failures
**Test Procedures:**
1. Test brute force protection on login endpoints
2. Check password policy enforcement (minimum length, complexity)
3. Verify session invalidation on logout and password change
4. Test "remember me" token security (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite flags)
5. Check multi-factor authentication bypass paths
**What to Look For:**
- Sessions that persist after logout
- Missing `HttpOnly` and `Secure` flags on session cookies
- Password reset tokens that don't expire
- Username enumeration via different error messages
### A08:2021 — Software and Data Integrity Failures
**Test Procedures:**
1. Check for unsigned updates or deployment artifacts
2. Verify CI/CD pipeline integrity (signed commits, protected branches)
3. Test deserialization endpoints with crafted payloads
4. Check for SRI (Subresource Integrity) on CDN-loaded scripts
**What to Look For:**
- Unsafe deserialization of user input (pickle, Java serialization)
- Missing integrity checks on downloaded artifacts
- CI/CD pipelines running untrusted code
- CDN scripts without SRI hashes
### A09:2021 — Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
**Test Procedures:**
1. Verify authentication events are logged (success and failure)
2. Check that logs don't contain sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII)
3. Test alerting thresholds (do 50 failed logins trigger an alert?)
4. Verify log integrity — can an attacker tamper with logs?
**What to Look For:**
- Missing audit trail for admin actions
- Passwords or tokens appearing in logs
- No alerting on suspicious patterns
- Logs stored without integrity protection
### A10:2021 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**Test Procedures:**
1. Test URL input fields with internal addresses (`http://169.254.169.254/` for cloud metadata)
2. Check for open redirect chains that reach internal services
3. Test with DNS rebinding payloads
4. Verify allowlist validation on outbound requests
**What to Look For:**
- User-controlled URLs passed to `fetch()`, `requests.get()`, `curl`
- Missing allowlist on outbound HTTP requests
- Ability to reach cloud metadata endpoints (AWS, GCP, Azure)
- PDF generators or screenshot services that fetch arbitrary URLs
See [owasp_top_10_checklist.md](references/owasp_top_10_checklist.md) for detailed test procedures, code patterns to detect, remediation steps, and CVSS scoring guidance for each category.
---
## Static Analysis
### CodeQL Custom Rules
**Recommended tools:** CodeQL (custom queries for project-specific patterns), Semgrep (rule-based scanning with auto-fix), ESLint security plugins (`eslint-plugin-security`, `eslint-plugin-no-unsanitized`).
Write custom CodeQL queries for project-specific vulnerability patterns:
Key patterns to detect: SQL injection via string concatenation, hardcoded JWT secrets, unsafe YAML/pickle deserialization, missing security middleware (e.g., Express without Helmet).
```ql
/**
* Detect SQL injection via string concatenation
*/
import python
import semmle.python.dataflow.new.DataFlow
from Call call, StringFormatting fmt
where
call.getFunc().getName() = "execute" and
fmt = call.getArg(0) and
exists(DataFlow::Node source |
source.asExpr() instanceof Name and
DataFlow::localFlow(source, DataFlow::exprNode(fmt.getAnOperand()))
)
select call, "Potential SQL injection: user input flows into execute()"
```
### Semgrep Custom Rules
Create project-specific Semgrep rules:
```yaml
rules:
- id: hardcoded-jwt-secret
pattern: |
jwt.encode($PAYLOAD, "...", ...)
message: "JWT signed with hardcoded secret"
severity: ERROR
languages: [python]
- id: unsafe-yaml-load
pattern: yaml.load($DATA)
fix: yaml.safe_load($DATA)
message: "Use yaml.safe_load() to prevent arbitrary code execution"
severity: WARNING
languages: [python]
- id: express-no-helmet
pattern: |
const app = express();
...
app.listen(...)
pattern-not: |
const app = express();
...
app.use(helmet(...));
...
app.listen(...)
message: "Express app missing helmet middleware for security headers"
severity: WARNING
languages: [javascript, typescript]
```
### ESLint Security Plugins
Recommended configuration:
```json
{
"plugins": ["security", "no-unsanitized"],
"extends": ["plugin:security/recommended"],
"rules": {
"security/detect-object-injection": "error",
"security/detect-non-literal-regexp": "warn",
"security/detect-unsafe-regex": "error",
"security/detect-buffer-noassert": "error",
"security/detect-eval-with-expression": "error",
"no-unsanitized/method": "error",
"no-unsanitized/property": "error"
}
}
```
See [attack_patterns.md](references/attack_patterns.md) for code patterns and detection payloads across injection types.
---
## Dependency Vulnerability Scanning
### Ecosystem-Specific Commands
**Ecosystem commands:** `npm audit`, `pip audit`, `govulncheck ./...`, `bundle audit check`
**CVE Triage Workflow:**
1. **Collect** — Run ecosystem audit tools, aggregate findings
2. **Deduplicate** — Group by CVE ID across direct and transitive deps
3. **Prioritize** — Critical + exploitable + reachable = fix immediately
4. **Remediate** — Upgrade, patch, or mitigate with compensating controls
5. **Verify** — Rerun audit to confirm fix, update lock files
```bash
# Node.js
npm audit --json | jq '.vulnerabilities | to_entries[] | select(.value.severity == "critical")'
# Python
pip audit --format json --desc
safety check --json
# Go
govulncheck ./...
# Ruby
bundle audit check --update
```
### CVE Triage Workflow
1. **Collect**: Run ecosystem audit tools, aggregate findings
2. **Deduplicate**: Group by CVE ID across direct and transitive deps
3. **Score**: Use CVSS base score + environmental adjustments
4. **Prioritize**: Critical + exploitable + reachable = fix immediately
5. **Remediate**: Upgrade, patch, or mitigate with compensating controls
6. **Verify**: Rerun audit to confirm fix, update lock files
```bash
# Use the dependency auditor for automated triage
python scripts/dependency_auditor.py --file package.json --severity critical --json
```
### Known Vulnerable Patterns
| Package | Vulnerable Versions | CVE | Impact |
|---------|-------------------|-----|--------|
| log4j-core | 2.0 - 2.14.1 | CVE-2021-44228 | RCE via JNDI injection |
| lodash | < 4.17.21 | CVE-2021-23337 | Prototype pollution |
| axios | < 1.6.0 | CVE-2023-45857 | CSRF token exposure |
| pillow | < 9.3.0 | CVE-2022-45198 | DoS via crafted image |
| express | < 4.19.2 | CVE-2024-29041 | Open redirect |
---
## Secret Scanning
### TruffleHog Patterns
**Tools:** TruffleHog (git history + filesystem), Gitleaks (regex-based with custom rules).
```bash
# Scan git history for secrets
# Scan git history for verified secrets
trufflehog git file://. --only-verified --json
# Scan filesystem (no git history)
# Scan filesystem
trufflehog filesystem . --json
```
### Gitleaks Configuration
```toml
# .gitleaks.toml
title = "Custom Gitleaks Config"
[[rules]]
id = "aws-access-key"
description = "AWS Access Key ID"
regex = '''AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'''
tags = ["aws", "credentials"]
[[rules]]
id = "generic-api-key"
description = "Generic API Key"
regex = '''(?i)(api[_-]?key|apikey)\s*[:=]\s*['\"][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}['\"]'''
tags = ["api", "key"]
[[rules]]
id = "private-key"
description = "Private Key Header"
regex = '''-----BEGIN (RSA|EC|DSA|OPENSSH) PRIVATE KEY-----'''
tags = ["private-key"]
[allowlist]
paths = ['''\.test\.''', '''_test\.go''', '''mock''', '''fixture''']
```
### Pre-commit Hook Integration
```yaml
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
rev: v8.18.0
hooks:
- id: gitleaks
- repo: https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog
rev: v3.63.0
hooks:
- id: trufflehog
args: ["git", "file://.", "--since-commit", "HEAD", "--only-verified"]
```
### CI Integration (GitHub Actions)
```yaml
name: Secret Scan
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main
with:
extra_args: --only-verified
```
**Integration points:** Pre-commit hooks (gitleaks, trufflehog), CI/CD gates (GitHub Actions with `trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main`). Configure `.gitleaks.toml` for custom rules (AWS keys, API keys, private key headers) and allowlists for test fixtures.
---
@@ -414,252 +132,45 @@ jobs:
### Authentication Bypass
**JWT Manipulation:**
1. Decode token at jwt.io — inspect claims without verification
2. Change `alg` to `none` and remove signature: `eyJ...payload.`
3. Change `alg` from RS256 to HS256 and sign with the public key
4. Modify claims (`role: "admin"`, `exp: 9999999999`) and re-sign with weak secrets
5. Test key confusion: HMAC signed with RSA public key bytes
**Session Fixation:**
1. Obtain a session token before authentication
2. Authenticate — check if the session ID changes
3. If the same session ID persists, the app is vulnerable to session fixation
- **JWT manipulation:** Change `alg` to `none`, RS256-to-HS256 confusion, claim modification (`role: "admin"`, `exp: 9999999999`)
- **Session fixation:** Check if session ID changes after authentication
### Authorization Flaws
**IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference):**
```
GET /api/users/123/profile → 200 (your profile)
GET /api/users/124/profile → 200 (someone else's profile — IDOR!)
GET /api/users/124/profile → 403 (properly protected)
```
- **IDOR/BOLA:** Change resource IDs in every endpoint — test read, update, delete across users
- **BFLA:** Regular user tries admin endpoints (expect 403)
- **Mass assignment:** Add privileged fields (`role`, `is_admin`) to update requests
Test pattern: Change numeric IDs, UUIDs, slugs in every endpoint. Use Burp Intruder or a simple script to iterate.
### Rate Limiting & GraphQL
**BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization):**
Same as IDOR but specifically in REST APIs. Test every CRUD operation:
- Can user A read user B's resource?
- Can user A update user B's resource?
- Can user A delete user B's resource?
- **Rate limiting:** Rapid-fire requests to auth endpoints; expect 429 after threshold
- **GraphQL:** Test introspection (should be disabled in prod), query depth attacks, batch mutations bypassing rate limits
**BFLA (Broken Function Level Authorization):**
```
# Regular user tries admin endpoints
POST /api/admin/users → Should be 403
DELETE /api/admin/users/123 → Should be 403
PUT /api/settings/global → Should be 403
```
### Rate Limiting Validation
Test rate limits on critical endpoints:
```bash
# Rapid-fire login attempts
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST https://target.com/api/login \
-d '{"email":"test@test.com","password":"wrong"}';
done
# Expect: 429 after threshold (typically 5-10 attempts)
```
### Mass Assignment Detection
```bash
# Try adding admin fields to a regular update request
PUT /api/users/profile
{
"name": "Normal User",
"email": "user@test.com",
"role": "admin", # mass assignment attempt
"is_verified": true, # mass assignment attempt
"subscription": "enterprise" # mass assignment attempt
}
```
### GraphQL-Specific Testing
**Introspection Query:**
```graphql
{
__schema {
types { name fields { name type { name } } }
}
}
```
Introspection should be **disabled in production**.
**Query Depth Attack:**
```graphql
{
user(id: 1) {
friends {
friends {
friends {
friends { # Keep nesting until server crashes
name
}
}
}
}
}
}
```
**Batching Attack:**
```json
[
{"query": "mutation { login(user:\"admin\", pass:\"password1\") { token } }"},
{"query": "mutation { login(user:\"admin\", pass:\"password2\") { token } }"},
{"query": "mutation { login(user:\"admin\", pass:\"password3\") { token } }"}
]
```
Batch mutations can bypass rate limiting if counted as a single request.
See [attack_patterns.md](references/attack_patterns.md) for complete JWT manipulation payloads, IDOR testing methodology, BFLA endpoint lists, GraphQL introspection/depth/batch attack patterns, and rate limiting bypass techniques.
---
## Web Vulnerability Testing
### XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)
| Vulnerability | Key Tests |
|--------------|-----------|
| **XSS** | Reflected (script/img/svg payloads), Stored (persistent fields), DOM-based (innerHTML + location.hash) |
| **CSRF** | Replay without token (expect 403), cross-session token replay, check SameSite cookie attribute |
| **SQL Injection** | Error-based (`' OR 1=1--`), union-based enumeration, time-based blind (`SLEEP(5)`), boolean-based blind |
| **SSRF** | Internal IPs, cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure), IPv6/hex/decimal encoding bypasses |
| **Path Traversal** | `../../../etc/passwd`, URL encoding, double encoding bypasses |
**Reflected XSS Test Payloads** (non-destructive):
```
<script>alert(document.domain)</script>
"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
javascript:alert(document.domain)
<svg onload=alert(document.domain)>
'-alert(document.domain)-'
</script><script>alert(document.domain)</script>
```
**Stored XSS**: Submit payloads in persistent fields (comments, profiles, messages), then check if they render for other users.
**DOM-Based XSS**: Look for `innerHTML`, `document.write()`, `eval()` operating on `location.hash`, `location.search`, or `document.referrer`.
### CSRF Token Validation
1. Capture a legitimate request with CSRF token
2. Replay the request without the token — should fail (403)
3. Replay with a token from a different session — should fail
4. Check if token changes per request or is static per session
5. Verify `SameSite` cookie attribute is set to `Strict` or `Lax`
### SQL Injection
**Detection Payloads** (safe, non-destructive):
```
' OR '1'='1
' OR '1'='1' --
" OR "1"="1
1 OR 1=1
' UNION SELECT NULL--
' AND SLEEP(5)-- (time-based blind)
' AND 1=1-- (boolean-based blind)
```
**Union-Based Enumeration** (authorized testing only):
```sql
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3-- -- Find column count
' UNION SELECT table_name,2,3 FROM information_schema.tables--
' UNION SELECT column_name,2,3 FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name='users'--
```
**Time-Based Blind:**
```sql
' AND IF(1=1, SLEEP(5), 0)-- -- MySQL
' AND pg_sleep(5)-- -- PostgreSQL
' WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-- -- MSSQL
```
### SSRF Detection
**Payloads for SSRF testing:**
```
http://127.0.0.1
http://localhost
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ (AWS metadata)
http://metadata.google.internal/ (GCP metadata)
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance (Azure metadata)
http://[::1] (IPv6 localhost)
http://0x7f000001 (hex encoding)
http://2130706433 (decimal encoding)
```
### Path Traversal
```
GET /api/files?name=../../../etc/passwd
GET /api/files?name=....//....//....//etc/passwd
GET /api/files?name=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd
GET /api/files?name=..%252f..%252f..%252fetc%252fpasswd (double encoding)
```
See [attack_patterns.md](references/attack_patterns.md) for complete test payloads (XSS filter bypasses, context-specific XSS, SQL injection per database engine, SSRF bypass techniques, and DOM-based XSS source/sink pairs).
---
## Infrastructure Security
### Misconfigured Cloud Storage
**S3 Bucket Checks:**
```bash
# Check for public read access
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket --no-sign-request
# Check bucket policy
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket target-bucket
# Check ACL
aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket target-bucket
```
**Common Bucket Name Patterns:**
```
{company}-backup, {company}-dev, {company}-staging
{company}-assets, {company}-uploads, {company}-logs
```
### HTTP Security Headers
Required headers and expected values:
| Header | Expected Value |
|--------|---------------|
| `Strict-Transport-Security` | `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload` |
| `Content-Security-Policy` | Restrictive policy, no `unsafe-inline` or `unsafe-eval` |
| `X-Content-Type-Options` | `nosniff` |
| `X-Frame-Options` | `DENY` or `SAMEORIGIN` |
| `Referrer-Policy` | `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` |
| `Permissions-Policy` | Restrict camera, microphone, geolocation |
| `X-XSS-Protection` | `0` (deprecated, CSP is preferred) |
### TLS Configuration
```bash
# Check TLS version and cipher suites
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 target.com
# Quick check with testssl.sh
./testssl.sh target.com
# Check certificate expiry
echo | openssl s_client -connect target.com:443 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -dates
```
**Reject:** TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, RC4, DES, 3DES, MD5 in cipher suites, CBC mode ciphers (BEAST), export-grade ciphers.
### Open Port Scanning
```bash
# Quick top-1000 ports
nmap -sV target.com
# Full port scan
nmap -p- -sV target.com
# Common dangerous open ports
# 21 (FTP), 23 (Telnet), 445 (SMB), 3389 (RDP), 6379 (Redis), 27017 (MongoDB)
```
**Key checks:**
- **Cloud storage:** S3 bucket public access (`aws s3 ls s3://bucket --no-sign-request`), bucket policies, ACLs
- **HTTP security headers:** HSTS, CSP (no `unsafe-inline`/`unsafe-eval`), X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy
- **TLS configuration:** `nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 target.com` or `testssl.sh` — reject TLS 1.0/1.1, RC4, 3DES, export-grade ciphers
- **Port scanning:** `nmap -sV target.com` — flag dangerous open ports (FTP/21, Telnet/23, Redis/6379, MongoDB/27017)
---
@@ -708,26 +219,11 @@ python scripts/pentest_report_generator.py --findings findings.json --format jso
## Responsible Disclosure Workflow
Responsible disclosure is **mandatory** for any vulnerability found during authorized testing or independent research. See `references/responsible_disclosure.md` for full templates.
Responsible disclosure is **mandatory** for any vulnerability found during authorized testing. Standard timeline: report on day 1, follow up at day 7, status update at day 30, public disclosure at day 90.
### Timeline
**Key principles:** Never exploit beyond proof of concept, encrypt all communications, do not access real user data, document everything with timestamps.
| Day | Action |
|-----|--------|
| 0 | Discovery — document finding with evidence |
| 1 | Report to vendor via security contact or bug bounty program |
| 7 | Follow up if no acknowledgment received |
| 30 | Request status update and remediation timeline |
| 60 | Second follow-up — offer technical assistance |
| 90 | Public disclosure (with or without fix, per industry standard) |
### Key Principles
1. **Never exploit beyond proof of concept** — demonstrate impact without causing damage
2. **Encrypt all communications** — PGP/GPG for email, secure channels for details
3. **Do not access, modify, or exfiltrate real user data** — use your own test accounts
4. **Document everything** — timestamps, screenshots, request/response pairs
5. **Respect the vendor's timeline** — extend deadline if they're actively working on a fix
See [responsible_disclosure.md](references/responsible_disclosure.md) for full disclosure timelines (standard 90-day, accelerated 30-day, extended 120-day), communication templates, legal considerations, bug bounty program integration, and CVE request process.
---
@@ -781,47 +277,7 @@ python scripts/pentest_report_generator.py --findings findings.json --format md
### Workflow 3: CI/CD Security Gate
Automated security checks that run on every pull request:
```yaml
# .github/workflows/security-gate.yml
name: Security Gate
on: [pull_request]
jobs:
security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
# Secret scanning
- name: Scan for secrets
uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main
with:
extra_args: --only-verified
# Dependency audit
- name: Audit dependencies
run: |
npm audit --audit-level=high
pip audit --desc
# SAST
- name: Static analysis
uses: returntocorp/semgrep-action@v1
with:
config: >-
p/security-audit
p/secrets
p/owasp-top-ten
# Security headers check (staging only)
- name: Check security headers
if: github.base_ref == 'staging'
run: |
curl -sI $STAGING_URL | python scripts/vulnerability_scanner.py --target web --scope quick
```
Automated security checks on every PR: secret scanning (TruffleHog), dependency audit (`npm audit`, `pip audit`), SAST (Semgrep with `p/security-audit`, `p/owasp-top-ten`), and security headers check on staging.
**Gate Policy**: Block merge on critical/high findings. Warn on medium. Log low/info.

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@@ -547,3 +547,83 @@ PUT /api/login
```
If any of these bypass rate limiting, the implementation needs hardening.
---
## Static Analysis Tool Configurations
### CodeQL Custom Rules
Write custom CodeQL queries for project-specific vulnerability patterns:
```ql
/**
* Detect SQL injection via string concatenation
*/
import python
import semmle.python.dataflow.new.DataFlow
from Call call, StringFormatting fmt
where
call.getFunc().getName() = "execute" and
fmt = call.getArg(0) and
exists(DataFlow::Node source |
source.asExpr() instanceof Name and
DataFlow::localFlow(source, DataFlow::exprNode(fmt.getAnOperand()))
)
select call, "Potential SQL injection: user input flows into execute()"
```
### Semgrep Custom Rules
```yaml
rules:
- id: hardcoded-jwt-secret
pattern: |
jwt.encode($PAYLOAD, "...", ...)
message: "JWT signed with hardcoded secret"
severity: ERROR
languages: [python]
- id: unsafe-yaml-load
pattern: yaml.load($DATA)
fix: yaml.safe_load($DATA)
message: "Use yaml.safe_load() to prevent arbitrary code execution"
severity: WARNING
languages: [python]
- id: express-no-helmet
pattern: |
const app = express();
...
app.listen(...)
pattern-not: |
const app = express();
...
app.use(helmet(...));
...
app.listen(...)
message: "Express app missing helmet middleware for security headers"
severity: WARNING
languages: [javascript, typescript]
```
### ESLint Security Plugins
Recommended configuration:
```json
{
"plugins": ["security", "no-unsanitized"],
"extends": ["plugin:security/recommended"],
"rules": {
"security/detect-object-injection": "error",
"security/detect-non-literal-regexp": "warn",
"security/detect-unsafe-regex": "error",
"security/detect-buffer-noassert": "error",
"security/detect-eval-with-expression": "error",
"no-unsanitized/method": "error",
"no-unsanitized/property": "error"
}
}
```

366
engineering/browser-automation/SKILL.md
View File

@@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ The Browser Automation skill provides comprehensive tools and knowledge for buil
### 1. Web Scraping Patterns
#### DOM Extraction with CSS Selectors
CSS selectors are the primary tool for element targeting. Prefer them over XPath for readability and performance.
**Selector priority (most to least reliable):**
1. `data-testid`, `data-id`, or custom data attributes — stable across redesigns
2. `#id` selectors — unique but may change between deploys
@@ -43,365 +40,70 @@ CSS selectors are the primary tool for element targeting. Prefer them over XPath
4. Class-based: `.product-card`, `.price` — brittle if classes are generated (e.g., CSS modules)
5. Positional: `nth-child()`, `nth-of-type()` — last resort, breaks on layout changes
**Compound selectors for precision:**
```python
# Product cards within a specific container
page.query_selector_all("div.search-results > article.product-card")
Use XPath only when CSS cannot express the relationship (e.g., ancestor traversal, text-based selection).
# Price inside a product card (scoped)
card.query_selector("span[data-field='price']")
# Links with specific text content
page.locator("a", has_text="Next Page")
```
#### XPath for Complex Traversal
Use XPath only when CSS cannot express the relationship:
```python
# Find element by text content (XPath strength)
page.locator("//td[contains(text(), 'Total')]/following-sibling::td[1]")
# Navigate up the DOM tree
page.locator("//span[@class='price']/ancestor::div[@class='product']")
```
#### Pagination Patterns
- **Next-button pagination**: Click "Next" until disabled or absent
- **URL-based pagination**: Increment `?page=N` or `&offset=N` in URL
- **Infinite scroll**: Scroll to bottom, wait for new content, repeat until no change
- **Load-more button**: Click button, wait for DOM mutation, repeat
#### Infinite Scroll Handling
```python
async def scroll_to_bottom(page, max_scrolls=50, pause_ms=1500):
previous_height = 0
for i in range(max_scrolls):
current_height = await page.evaluate("document.body.scrollHeight")
if current_height == previous_height:
break
await page.evaluate("window.scrollTo(0, document.body.scrollHeight)")
await page.wait_for_timeout(pause_ms)
previous_height = current_height
return i + 1 # number of scrolls performed
```
**Pagination strategies:** next-button, URL-based (`?page=N`), infinite scroll, load-more button. See [data_extraction_recipes.md](references/data_extraction_recipes.md) for complete pagination handlers and scroll patterns.
### 2. Form Filling & Multi-Step Workflows
#### Login Flows
```python
async def login(page, url, username, password):
await page.goto(url)
await page.fill("input[name='username']", username)
await page.fill("input[name='password']", password)
await page.click("button[type='submit']")
# Wait for navigation to complete (post-login redirect)
await page.wait_for_url("**/dashboard**")
```
Break multi-step forms into discrete functions per step. Each function fills fields, clicks "Next"/"Continue", and waits for the next step to load (URL change or DOM element).
#### Multi-Page Forms
Break multi-step forms into discrete functions per step. Each function:
1. Fills the fields for that step
2. Clicks the "Next" or "Continue" button
3. Waits for the next step to load (URL change or DOM element)
```python
async def fill_step_1(page, data):
await page.fill("#first-name", data["first_name"])
await page.fill("#last-name", data["last_name"])
await page.select_option("#country", data["country"])
await page.click("button:has-text('Continue')")
await page.wait_for_selector("#step-2-form")
async def fill_step_2(page, data):
await page.fill("#address", data["address"])
await page.fill("#city", data["city"])
await page.click("button:has-text('Continue')")
await page.wait_for_selector("#step-3-form")
```
#### File Uploads
```python
# Single file
await page.set_input_files("input[type='file']", "/path/to/file.pdf")
# Multiple files
await page.set_input_files("input[type='file']", [
"/path/to/file1.pdf",
"/path/to/file2.pdf"
])
# Drag-and-drop upload zones (no visible input element)
async with page.expect_file_chooser() as fc_info:
await page.click("div.upload-zone")
file_chooser = await fc_info.value
await file_chooser.set_files("/path/to/file.pdf")
```
#### Dropdown and Select Handling
```python
# Native <select> element
await page.select_option("#country", value="US")
await page.select_option("#country", label="United States")
# Custom dropdown (div-based)
await page.click("div.dropdown-trigger")
await page.click("div.dropdown-option:has-text('United States')")
```
Key patterns: login flows, multi-page forms, file uploads (including drag-and-drop zones), native and custom dropdown handling. See [playwright_browser_api.md](references/playwright_browser_api.md) for complete API reference on `fill()`, `select_option()`, `set_input_files()`, and `expect_file_chooser()`.
### 3. Screenshot & PDF Capture
#### Screenshot Strategies
```python
# Full page (scrolls automatically)
await page.screenshot(path="full-page.png", full_page=True)
- **Full page:** `await page.screenshot(path="full.png", full_page=True)`
- **Element:** `await page.locator("div.chart").screenshot(path="chart.png")`
- **PDF (Chromium only):** `await page.pdf(path="out.pdf", format="A4", print_background=True)`
- **Visual regression:** Take screenshots at known states, store baselines in version control with naming: `{page}_{viewport}_{state}.png`
# Viewport only (what's visible)
await page.screenshot(path="viewport.png")
# Specific element
element = page.locator("div.chart-container")
await element.screenshot(path="chart.png")
# With custom viewport for consistency
context = await browser.new_context(viewport={"width": 1920, "height": 1080})
```
#### PDF Generation
```python
# Only works in Chromium
await page.pdf(
path="output.pdf",
format="A4",
margin={"top": "1cm", "right": "1cm", "bottom": "1cm", "left": "1cm"},
print_background=True
)
```
#### Visual Regression Baselines
Take screenshots at known states and compare pixel-by-pixel. Store baselines in version control. Use naming conventions: `{page}_{viewport}_{state}.png`.
See [playwright_browser_api.md](references/playwright_browser_api.md) for full screenshot/PDF options.
### 4. Structured Data Extraction
#### Tables to JSON
```python
async def extract_table(page, selector):
headers = await page.eval_on_selector_all(
f"{selector} thead th",
"elements => elements.map(e => e.textContent.trim())"
)
rows = await page.eval_on_selector_all(
f"{selector} tbody tr",
"""rows => rows.map(row => {
return Array.from(row.querySelectorAll('td'))
.map(cell => cell.textContent.trim())
})"""
)
return [dict(zip(headers, row)) for row in rows]
```
Core extraction patterns:
- **Tables to JSON** — Extract `<thead>` headers and `<tbody>` rows into dictionaries
- **Listings to arrays** — Map repeating card elements using a field-selector map (supports `::attr()` for attributes)
- **Nested/threaded data** — Recursive extraction for comments with replies, category trees
#### Listings to Arrays
```python
async def extract_listings(page, container_sel, field_map):
"""
field_map example: {"title": "h3.title", "price": "span.price", "url": "a::attr(href)"}
"""
items = []
cards = await page.query_selector_all(container_sel)
for card in cards:
item = {}
for field, sel in field_map.items():
if "::attr(" in sel:
attr_sel, attr_name = sel.split("::attr(")
attr_name = attr_name.rstrip(")")
el = await card.query_selector(attr_sel)
item[field] = await el.get_attribute(attr_name) if el else None
else:
el = await card.query_selector(sel)
item[field] = (await el.text_content()).strip() if el else None
items.append(item)
return items
```
#### Nested Data Extraction
For threaded content (comments with replies), use recursive extraction:
```python
async def extract_comments(page, parent_selector):
comments = []
elements = await page.query_selector_all(f"{parent_selector} > .comment")
for el in elements:
text = await (await el.query_selector(".comment-body")).text_content()
author = await (await el.query_selector(".author")).text_content()
replies = await extract_comments(el, ".replies")
comments.append({
"author": author.strip(),
"text": text.strip(),
"replies": replies
})
return comments
```
See [data_extraction_recipes.md](references/data_extraction_recipes.md) for complete extraction functions, price parsing, data cleaning utilities, and output format helpers (JSON, CSV, JSONL).
### 5. Cookie & Session Management
#### Save and Restore Sessions
```python
import json
- **Save/restore cookies:** `context.cookies()` and `context.add_cookies()`
- **Full storage state** (cookies + localStorage): `context.storage_state(path="state.json")` to save, `browser.new_context(storage_state="state.json")` to restore
# Save cookies after login
cookies = await context.cookies()
with open("session.json", "w") as f:
json.dump(cookies, f)
# Restore session in new context
with open("session.json", "r") as f:
cookies = json.load(f)
context = await browser.new_context()
await context.add_cookies(cookies)
```
#### Storage State (Cookies + Local Storage)
```python
# Save full state (cookies + localStorage + sessionStorage)
await context.storage_state(path="state.json")
# Restore full state
context = await browser.new_context(storage_state="state.json")
```
**Best practice:** Save state after login, reuse across scraping sessions. Check session validity before starting a long job — make a lightweight request to a protected page and verify you are not redirected to login.
**Best practice:** Save state after login, reuse across scraping sessions. Check session validity before starting a long job — make a lightweight request to a protected page and verify you are not redirected to login. See [playwright_browser_api.md](references/playwright_browser_api.md) for cookie and storage state API details.
### 6. Anti-Detection Patterns
Modern websites detect automation through multiple vectors. Address all of them:
Modern websites detect automation through multiple vectors. Apply these in priority order:
#### User Agent Rotation
Never use the default Playwright user agent. Rotate through real browser user agents:
```python
USER_AGENTS = [
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
]
```
1. **WebDriver flag removal** — Remove `navigator.webdriver = true` via init script (critical)
2. **Custom user agent** — Rotate through real browser UAs; never use the default headless UA
3. **Realistic viewport** — Set 1920x1080 or similar real-world dimensions (default 800x600 is a red flag)
4. **Request throttling** — Add `random.uniform()` delays between actions
5. **Proxy support** — Per-browser or per-context proxy configuration
#### Viewport and Screen Size
Set realistic viewport dimensions. The default 800x600 is a red flag:
```python
context = await browser.new_context(
viewport={"width": 1920, "height": 1080},
screen={"width": 1920, "height": 1080},
user_agent=random.choice(USER_AGENTS),
)
```
#### WebDriver Flag Removal
Playwright sets `navigator.webdriver = true`. Remove it:
```python
await page.add_init_script("""
Object.defineProperty(navigator, 'webdriver', {get: () => undefined});
""")
```
#### Request Throttling
Add human-like delays between actions:
```python
import random
async def human_delay(min_ms=500, max_ms=2000):
delay = random.randint(min_ms, max_ms)
await page.wait_for_timeout(delay)
```
#### Proxy Support
```python
browser = await playwright.chromium.launch(
proxy={"server": "http://proxy.example.com:8080"}
)
# Or per-context:
context = await browser.new_context(
proxy={"server": "http://proxy.example.com:8080",
"username": "user", "password": "pass"}
)
```
See [anti_detection_patterns.md](references/anti_detection_patterns.md) for the complete stealth stack: navigator property hardening, WebGL/canvas fingerprint evasion, behavioral simulation (mouse movement, typing speed, scroll patterns), proxy rotation strategies, and detection self-test URLs.
### 7. Dynamic Content Handling
#### SPA Rendering
SPAs render content client-side. Wait for the actual content, not the page load:
```python
await page.goto(url)
# Wait for the data to render, not just the shell
await page.wait_for_selector("div.product-list article", state="attached")
```
- **SPA rendering:** Wait for content selectors (`wait_for_selector`), not the page load event
- **AJAX/Fetch waiting:** Use `page.expect_response("**/api/data*")` to intercept and wait for specific API calls
- **Shadow DOM:** Playwright pierces open Shadow DOM with `>>` operator: `page.locator("custom-element >> .inner-class")`
- **Lazy-loaded images:** Scroll elements into view with `scroll_into_view_if_needed()` to trigger loading
#### AJAX / Fetch Waiting
Intercept and wait for specific API calls:
```python
async with page.expect_response("**/api/products*") as response_info:
await page.click("button.load-more")
response = await response_info.value
data = await response.json() # You can use the API data directly
```
#### Shadow DOM Traversal
```python
# Playwright pierces open Shadow DOM automatically with >>
await page.locator("custom-element >> .inner-class").click()
```
#### Lazy-Loaded Images
Scroll elements into view to trigger lazy loading:
```python
images = await page.query_selector_all("img[data-src]")
for img in images:
await img.scroll_into_view_if_needed()
await page.wait_for_timeout(200)
```
See [playwright_browser_api.md](references/playwright_browser_api.md) for wait strategies, network interception, and Shadow DOM details.
### 8. Error Handling & Retry Logic
#### Retry Decorator Pattern
```python
import asyncio
- **Retry with backoff:** Wrap page interactions in retry logic with exponential backoff (e.g., 1s, 2s, 4s)
- **Fallback selectors:** On `TimeoutError`, try alternative selectors before failing
- **Error-state screenshots:** Capture `page.screenshot(path="error-state.png")` on unexpected failures for debugging
- **Rate limit detection:** Check for HTTP 429 responses and respect `Retry-After` headers
async def with_retry(coro_factory, max_retries=3, backoff_base=2):
for attempt in range(max_retries):
try:
return await coro_factory()
except Exception as e:
if attempt == max_retries - 1:
raise
wait = backoff_base ** attempt
print(f"Attempt {attempt + 1} failed: {e}. Retrying in {wait}s...")
await asyncio.sleep(wait)
```
#### Handling Common Failures
```python
from playwright.async_api import TimeoutError as PlaywrightTimeout
try:
await page.click("button.submit", timeout=5000)
except PlaywrightTimeout:
# Element did not appear — page structure may have changed
# Try fallback selector
await page.click("[type='submit']", timeout=5000)
except Exception as e:
# Network error, browser crash, etc.
await page.screenshot(path="error-state.png")
raise
```
#### Rate Limit Detection
```python
async def check_rate_limit(response):
if response.status == 429:
retry_after = response.headers.get("retry-after", "60")
wait_seconds = int(retry_after)
print(f"Rate limited. Waiting {wait_seconds}s...")
await asyncio.sleep(wait_seconds)
return True
return False
```
See [anti_detection_patterns.md](references/anti_detection_patterns.md) for the complete exponential backoff implementation and rate limiter class.
## Workflows

293
engineering/spec-driven-workflow/SKILL.md
View File

@@ -34,185 +34,32 @@ If the spec is not written, reviewed, and approved, implementation does not begi
Every spec follows this structure. No sections are optional — if a section does not apply, write "N/A — [reason]" so reviewers know it was considered, not forgotten.
### 1. Title and Context
### Mandatory Sections
```markdown
# Spec: [Feature Name]
| # | Section | Key Rules |
|---|---------|-----------|
| 1 | **Title and Metadata** | Author, date, status (Draft/In Review/Approved/Superseded), reviewers |
| 2 | **Context** | Why this feature exists. 2-4 paragraphs with evidence (metrics, tickets). |
| 3 | **Functional Requirements** | RFC 2119 keywords (MUST/SHOULD/MAY). Numbered FR-N. Each is atomic and testable. |
| 4 | **Non-Functional Requirements** | Performance, security, accessibility, scalability, reliability — all with measurable thresholds. |
| 5 | **Acceptance Criteria** | Given/When/Then format. Every AC references at least one FR-* or NFR-*. |
| 6 | **Edge Cases** | Numbered EC-N. Cover failure modes for every external dependency. |
| 7 | **API Contracts** | TypeScript-style interfaces. Cover success and error responses. |
| 8 | **Data Models** | Table format with field, type, constraints. Every entity from requirements must have a model. |
| 9 | **Out of Scope** | Explicit exclusions with reasons. Prevents scope creep during implementation. |
**Author:** [name]
**Date:** [ISO 8601]
**Status:** Draft | In Review | Approved | Superseded
**Reviewers:** [list]
**Related specs:** [links]
## Context
[Why does this feature exist? What problem does it solve? What is the business
motivation? Include links to user research, support tickets, or metrics that
justify this work. 2-4 paragraphs maximum.]
```
### 2. Functional Requirements (RFC 2119)
Use RFC 2119 keywords precisely:
### RFC 2119 Keywords
| Keyword | Meaning |
|---------|---------|
| **MUST** | Absolute requirement. Failing this means the implementation is non-conformant. |
| **MUST NOT** | Absolute prohibition. Doing this means the implementation is broken. |
| **SHOULD** | Recommended. May be omitted with documented justification. |
| **SHOULD NOT** | Discouraged. May be included with documented justification. |
| **MAY** | Optional. Purely at the implementer's discretion. |
| **MUST** | Absolute requirement. Non-conformant without it. |
| **MUST NOT** | Absolute prohibition. |
| **SHOULD** | Recommended. Omit only with documented justification. |
| **MAY** | Optional. Implementer's discretion. |
```markdown
## Functional Requirements
See [spec_format_guide.md](references/spec_format_guide.md) for the complete template with section-by-section examples, good/bad requirement patterns, and feature-type templates (CRUD, Integration, Migration).
- FR-1: The system MUST authenticate users via OAuth 2.0 PKCE flow.
- FR-2: The system MUST reject tokens older than 24 hours.
- FR-3: The system SHOULD support refresh token rotation.
- FR-4: The system MAY cache user profiles for up to 5 minutes.
- FR-5: The system MUST NOT store plaintext passwords under any circumstance.
```
Number every requirement. Use `FR-` prefix. Each requirement is a single, testable statement.
### 3. Non-Functional Requirements
```markdown
## Non-Functional Requirements
### Performance
- NFR-P1: Login flow MUST complete in < 500ms (p95) under normal load.
- NFR-P2: Token validation MUST complete in < 50ms (p99).
### Security
- NFR-S1: All tokens MUST be transmitted over TLS 1.2+.
- NFR-S2: The system MUST rate-limit login attempts to 5/minute per IP.
### Accessibility
- NFR-A1: Login form MUST meet WCAG 2.1 AA standards.
- NFR-A2: Error messages MUST be announced to screen readers.
### Scalability
- NFR-SC1: The system SHOULD handle 10,000 concurrent sessions.
### Reliability
- NFR-R1: The authentication service MUST maintain 99.9% uptime.
```
### 4. Acceptance Criteria (Given/When/Then)
Every functional requirement maps to one or more acceptance criteria. Use Gherkin syntax:
```markdown
## Acceptance Criteria
### AC-1: Successful login (FR-1)
Given a user with valid credentials
When they submit the login form with correct email and password
Then they receive a valid access token
And they are redirected to the dashboard
And the login event is logged with timestamp and IP
### AC-2: Expired token rejection (FR-2)
Given a user with an access token issued 25 hours ago
When they make an API request with that token
Then they receive a 401 Unauthorized response
And the response body contains error code "TOKEN_EXPIRED"
And they are NOT redirected (API clients handle their own flow)
### AC-3: Rate limiting (NFR-S2)
Given an IP address that has made 5 failed login attempts in the last minute
When a 6th login attempt arrives from that IP
Then the request is rejected with 429 Too Many Requests
And the response includes a Retry-After header
```
### 5. Edge Cases and Error Scenarios
```markdown
## Edge Cases
- EC-1: User submits login form with empty email → Show validation error, do not hit API.
- EC-2: OAuth provider is down → Show "Service temporarily unavailable", retry after 30s.
- EC-3: User has account but no password (social-only) → Redirect to social login.
- EC-4: Concurrent login from two devices → Both sessions are valid (no single-session enforcement).
- EC-5: Token expires mid-request → Complete the current request, return warning header.
```
### 6. API Contracts
Define request/response shapes using TypeScript-style notation:
```markdown
## API Contracts
### POST /api/auth/login
Request:
```typescript
interface LoginRequest {
email: string; // MUST be valid email format
password: string; // MUST be 8-128 characters
rememberMe?: boolean; // Default: false
}
```
Success Response (200):
```typescript
interface LoginResponse {
accessToken: string; // JWT, expires in 24h
refreshToken: string; // Opaque, expires in 30d
expiresIn: number; // Seconds until access token expires
user: {
id: string;
email: string;
displayName: string;
};
}
```
Error Response (401):
```typescript
interface AuthError {
error: "INVALID_CREDENTIALS" | "TOKEN_EXPIRED" | "ACCOUNT_LOCKED";
message: string;
retryAfter?: number; // Seconds, present for rate-limited responses
}
```
```
### 7. Data Models
```markdown
## Data Models
### User
| Field | Type | Constraints |
|-------|------|-------------|
| id | UUID | Primary key, auto-generated |
| email | string | Unique, max 255 chars, valid email format |
| passwordHash | string | bcrypt, never exposed via API |
| createdAt | timestamp | UTC, immutable |
| lastLoginAt | timestamp | UTC, updated on each login |
| loginAttempts | integer | Reset to 0 on successful login |
| lockedUntil | timestamp | Null if not locked |
```
### 8. Out of Scope
Explicit exclusions prevent scope creep:
```markdown
## Out of Scope
- OS-1: Multi-factor authentication (separate spec: SPEC-042)
- OS-2: Social login providers beyond Google and GitHub
- OS-3: Admin impersonation of user accounts
- OS-4: Password complexity rules beyond minimum length (deferred to v2)
- OS-5: Session management UI (users cannot see/revoke active sessions yet)
```
If someone asks for an out-of-scope item during implementation, point them to this section. Do not build it.
See [acceptance_criteria_patterns.md](references/acceptance_criteria_patterns.md) for a full pattern library of Given/When/Then criteria across authentication, CRUD, search, file upload, payment, notification, and accessibility scenarios.
---
@@ -405,107 +252,7 @@ Use `engineering/spec-driven-workflow` for:
## Examples
### Full Spec: User Password Reset
```markdown
# Spec: Password Reset Flow
**Author:** Engineering Team
**Date:** 2026-03-25
**Status:** Approved
## Context
Users who forget their passwords currently have no self-service recovery option.
Support receives ~200 password reset requests per week, costing approximately
8 hours of support time. This feature eliminates that burden entirely.
## Functional Requirements
- FR-1: The system MUST allow users to request a password reset via email.
- FR-2: The system MUST send a reset link that expires after 1 hour.
- FR-3: The system MUST invalidate all previous reset links when a new one is requested.
- FR-4: The system MUST enforce minimum password length of 8 characters on reset.
- FR-5: The system MUST NOT reveal whether an email exists in the system.
- FR-6: The system SHOULD log all reset attempts for audit purposes.
## Acceptance Criteria
### AC-1: Request reset (FR-1, FR-5)
Given a user on the password reset page
When they enter any email address and submit
Then they see "If an account exists, a reset link has been sent"
And the response is identical whether the email exists or not
### AC-2: Valid reset link (FR-2)
Given a user who received a reset email 30 minutes ago
When they click the reset link
Then they see the password reset form
### AC-3: Expired reset link (FR-2)
Given a user who received a reset email 2 hours ago
When they click the reset link
Then they see "This link has expired. Please request a new one."
### AC-4: Previous links invalidated (FR-3)
Given a user who requested two reset emails
When they click the link from the first email
Then they see "This link is no longer valid."
## Edge Cases
- EC-1: User submits reset for non-existent email → Same success message (FR-5).
- EC-2: User clicks reset link twice → Second click shows "already used" if password was changed.
- EC-3: Email delivery fails → Log error, do not retry automatically.
- EC-4: User requests reset while already logged in → Allow it, do not force logout.
## Out of Scope
- OS-1: Security questions as alternative reset method.
- OS-2: SMS-based password reset.
- OS-3: Admin-initiated password reset (separate spec).
```
### Extracted Test Cases (from above spec)
```python
# Generated by test_extractor.py --framework pytest
class TestPasswordReset:
def test_ac1_request_reset_existing_email(self):
"""AC-1: Request reset with existing email shows generic message."""
# Given a user on the password reset page
# When they enter a registered email and submit
# Then they see "If an account exists, a reset link has been sent"
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ac1_request_reset_nonexistent_email(self):
"""AC-1: Request reset with unknown email shows same generic message."""
# Given a user on the password reset page
# When they enter an unregistered email and submit
# Then they see identical response to existing email case
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ac2_valid_reset_link(self):
"""AC-2: Reset link works within expiry window."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ac3_expired_reset_link(self):
"""AC-3: Reset link rejected after 1 hour."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ac4_previous_links_invalidated(self):
"""AC-4: Old reset links stop working when new one is requested."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ec1_nonexistent_email_same_response(self):
"""EC-1: Non-existent email produces identical response."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ec2_reset_link_used_twice(self):
"""EC-2: Already-used reset link shows appropriate message."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
```
A complete worked example (Password Reset spec with extracted test cases) is available in [spec_format_guide.md](references/spec_format_guide.md#full-example-password-reset). It demonstrates all 9 sections, requirement numbering, acceptance criteria, edge cases, and the corresponding pytest stubs generated by `test_extractor.py`.
---

108
engineering/spec-driven-workflow/references/spec_format_guide.md
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@@ -421,3 +421,111 @@ Focus on: backward compatibility, rollback plan, data integrity, zero-downtime d
- [ ] No placeholder text remains
- [ ] Context includes evidence (metrics, tickets, research)
- [ ] Status is "In Review" (not still "Draft")
---
## Full Example: Password Reset
A complete spec demonstrating all sections, followed by extracted test stubs.
### The Spec
```markdown
# Spec: Password Reset Flow
**Author:** Engineering Team
**Date:** 2026-03-25
**Status:** Approved
## Context
Users who forget their passwords currently have no self-service recovery option.
Support receives ~200 password reset requests per week, costing approximately
8 hours of support time. This feature eliminates that burden entirely.
## Functional Requirements
- FR-1: The system MUST allow users to request a password reset via email.
- FR-2: The system MUST send a reset link that expires after 1 hour.
- FR-3: The system MUST invalidate all previous reset links when a new one is requested.
- FR-4: The system MUST enforce minimum password length of 8 characters on reset.
- FR-5: The system MUST NOT reveal whether an email exists in the system.
- FR-6: The system SHOULD log all reset attempts for audit purposes.
## Acceptance Criteria
### AC-1: Request reset (FR-1, FR-5)
Given a user on the password reset page
When they enter any email address and submit
Then they see "If an account exists, a reset link has been sent"
And the response is identical whether the email exists or not
### AC-2: Valid reset link (FR-2)
Given a user who received a reset email 30 minutes ago
When they click the reset link
Then they see the password reset form
### AC-3: Expired reset link (FR-2)
Given a user who received a reset email 2 hours ago
When they click the reset link
Then they see "This link has expired. Please request a new one."
### AC-4: Previous links invalidated (FR-3)
Given a user who requested two reset emails
When they click the link from the first email
Then they see "This link is no longer valid."
## Edge Cases
- EC-1: User submits reset for non-existent email → Same success message (FR-5).
- EC-2: User clicks reset link twice → Second click shows "already used" if password was changed.
- EC-3: Email delivery fails → Log error, do not retry automatically.
- EC-4: User requests reset while already logged in → Allow it, do not force logout.
## Out of Scope
- OS-1: Security questions as alternative reset method.
- OS-2: SMS-based password reset.
- OS-3: Admin-initiated password reset (separate spec).
```
### Extracted Test Cases
Generated by `test_extractor.py --framework pytest`:
```python
class TestPasswordReset:
def test_ac1_request_reset_existing_email(self):
"""AC-1: Request reset with existing email shows generic message."""
# Given a user on the password reset page
# When they enter a registered email and submit
# Then they see "If an account exists, a reset link has been sent"
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ac1_request_reset_nonexistent_email(self):
"""AC-1: Request reset with unknown email shows same generic message."""
# Given a user on the password reset page
# When they enter an unregistered email and submit
# Then they see identical response to existing email case
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ac2_valid_reset_link(self):
"""AC-2: Reset link works within expiry window."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ac3_expired_reset_link(self):
"""AC-3: Reset link rejected after 1 hour."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ac4_previous_links_invalidated(self):
"""AC-4: Old reset links stop working when new one is requested."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ec1_nonexistent_email_same_response(self):
"""EC-1: Non-existent email produces identical response."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
def test_ec2_reset_link_used_twice(self):
"""EC-2: Already-used reset link shows appropriate message."""
raise NotImplementedError("Implement this test")
```